The Influence of Product Markets on Industrial Relations by Brown, William
 
 
 
The Influence of Product Markets  
on Industrial Relations 
 
 
 
 
William Brown 
 
 
 
 
August 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CWPE 0652 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Influence of Product Markets on Industrial Relations 
 
 
William Brown 
Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Product markets are the foundation on which industrial relations institutions are built. 
Trade union strength is partly dependent upon the state of the labour market, but it is 
imperfections in the product market that are the precondition of their winning benefits 
for their members. Sectoral agreements consequently formed the basis for collective 
bargaining in most industrialised countries. But international competition has 
destroyed this for much of the private sector. Quasi-markets have undermined it for 
much of the public sector. The paper assesses the empirical economic literature on the 
impact of product markets. It considers enthnographic insights into how competitive 
pressures feed through to managerial behaviour. It concludes with alternative 
strategies – co-operative bargaining, legislative intervention, and consumer campaigns 
– that seek to defend labour standards from competitive erosion. 
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Industrial relations are profoundly affected by the nature of the markets in which firms compete. The 
relationships between employers and workers cannot avoid being influenced by the competitive 
pressures bearing down on the employers, whether those pressures are light and permissive, or tight 
and unforgiving. How employers respond to these pressures is another matter. There may be many 
different ways of managing labour that allow firms to keep afloat in a given competitive situation. 
There will be consequent differences in their industrial relations. But whatever style of labour 
management is adopted, an important and unavoidable constraint on that style is whether, and with 
what urgency, the firm’s business is under competitive threat.  
 
This chapter is concerned with the relationship between industrial relations and the intensity of 
competition for a firm’s goods and services – that is to say, the competitiveness of what is known 
generically as its ‘product market’. The chapter considers first the development of bargaining 
structures, designed in large part to manage these competitive pressures. It explores how this has 
influenced trade unions because, as the labour economist Nickell has observed, ‘what unions do 
depends upon what they can do, and this depends on the extent of product market competition’ (Boeri 
et al., 2001; 296). Attention is also given to public sector employment that, despite its insulation from 
normal price mechanisms, is now heavily influenced by comparable constraints. The chapter next 
considers survey-based economic evidence of the link between industrial relations and product 
markets. It then focuses in to look at ethnographic case study evidence. This sheds light on how 
competitive pressures are translated into the varied patterns of managerial control or complacency 
under which great diversity of industrial relations has developed in different industries and at different 
times. Finally, it considers the impact of the geographical widening of product market competition in 
an increasingly international economy, and the implications of this for contemporary industrial 
relations institutions, which were rarely intended to reach beyond national frontiers. 
 
Competitive influences on bargaining structure 
Product markets have, in a world of more or less imperfect competition, always had a huge influence 
on bargaining structures. The reasons lie in the nature of trade union activity. Unions attract and retain 
members by negotiating and protecting improvements in their pay and conditions of work. They have 
traditionally done this either directly by using the threat of strike action, or by controlling the supply of 
labour. The consequence is that, if they are successful, and unless there are off-setting productivity 
improvements, they increase unit wage costs for the firms that employ their members. But this in turn 
implies that they reduce those firms’ capacity to compete successfully in their product markets. So the 
organisational challenge facing unions is how to reduce the jeopardy in which members’ jobs are 
placed as a result of increasing the cost of their labour.       
 
The argument that this would be best met by unions’ organising the whole product market was 
explored by the institutional economist John Commons. In 1909, in a study of the development of the 
American shoe industry, he drew attention to the historical emergence of a gap separating the wage 
bargain (between the employer and workers) from the price bargain (between the retailer and the 
consumer). Relationships between journeymen, masters and customers that, in a restricted local 
economy, had regulated not only wages, but also prices and quality, gave way to increasing domination 
by merchant retailers who fixed prices by reference to the cheapest labour market from which they 
could obtain substitute goods, wherever that might be. The employment standards of the local labour 
market become threatened by those of the relevant product market, however great its geographical 
extent. He described how what he called the ‘competitive menace’ is the marginal producer ‘…with the 
lowest standards of living and cost and quality of work, he is the producer whose competition tends to 
drag down the level of others toward his own’ (Commons, 1964: 251).  
 
‘Throughout the course of industrial evolution the part played by the merchant stands out as the 
determining factor. The key to the situation is at all times the price-bargain,’ Commons argues. ‘It is 
the merchant who controls both capital and labor. If the merchant has a market, he can secure capital. 
The “conflict of capital and labor” is a conflict of market and labor, of merchant and wage-earner, of 
prices and wages.’ (op. cit.: 261) Associations of manufacturers are primarily price-regarding. An 
extension of the product market, to include lower-paying marginal producers, is likely to provoke 
conflict, because established wage-earners may try to protect their wages through trade union action, 
When this happens, ‘…the manufacturer turns, for the time, from the market and faces the workman. 
His “employers’ association” is wholly different in method, object and social significance, and usually 
in personnel from his “manufacturers’ association”’ (op. cit.: 262).  
 
Power in industrial relations thus follows the contours of the markets for the goods and services 
produced, and not just the contours of the market for labour. It is not that the labour market is 
irrelevant. Indeed, the state of the labour market is of great importance to the relative power of 
employers and unions. Other things being equal, unions generally become stronger if the labour they 
organise becomes scarcer. But what they and employers have to fight over is decided by the employers’ 
profits. They consequently do battle on a field delineated by the employers’ product market.  
 
The implications for unions are summarised by Kochan. He describes how Commons:  
‘showed that as transportation systems improved and it became feasible for 
employers to manufacture products in low labor cost cities and transport them to sell 
in high labor cost cities, it became necessary for unions to organise all competing 
employers in these various cities. The basic principle involved here is that unless 
unions organise all the substitutes for union labor, any increases in wage costs in the 
unionised portion of the market will result in a loss of employment to the non-union 
sector. Similarly, a strike by employees in the unionised sector will lead consumers to 
shift their demand to the non-union sector’ (Kochan, 1980: 50). 
 
Irrespective of whether labour is organised in trade unions, the management of it has been shaped by 
the predisposition of employers to see labour market issues as secondary to the price-driven pressures 
of the product market. Clegg notes that from very early on, many trade associations ‘…interfered with 
the laws of supply and demand on their own, even undertaking to regulate wages without any pressure 
from unions. This was true of both coal and iron. In coalmining the regulation of prices and wages on a 
county basis by the coal-owners was the general practice long before stable unions were established’ 
(Clegg, 1970: 122). In the present, as in the past, employers constantly monitor their local labour 
markets to ensure their own firm’s pay levels are sufficiently competitive to attract and retain workers. 
But they have a quite different concern with the cost implications of what their commercial competitors 
are paying, a concern which predisposes them, if possible, to ‘take wages out of competition’ by 
colluding with those competitors. It was Adam Smith who observed, well over two hundred years ago, 
that ‘Masters are always and everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to 
raise wages of labour over their actual rate’ (Smith, 1776: 59) 
 
Thus, while it is in the interest of unions to organise all the workers in a given product market, the 
employers whom they confront are predisposed to collude with each other as product market 
competitors. They do this in order to bring stability to employment, which is always a sensitive and 
potentially volatile aspect of any firm’s operations. It might seem surprising that there should be this 
congruence in employer and trade union organisational interests. But in practice it compounds into a 
broader collusion by both sides against the consumer of the product in question. Providing that all the 
employers in the product market are united, collectively they maintain a monopoly position which 
permits them to charge the consumer higher prices than would otherwise be the case. The resulting 
monopoly profits (referred to by economists as ‘rents’) may then, in effect, be shared with the union 
members by means of a collective agreement that establishes pay levels that are higher than would 
otherwise have been the case. This is where the state of the labour market and the organisational 
strength of the union become important; they influence what share of rents the union can win. 
 
By combining against the consumer across the full extent of their product market, both sides benefit. 
The unions gain employer recognition and also relatively favourable, and stable, terms of employment 
for their members. Individual employers have the tricky problem of managing pay and conditions 
looked after by their employers’ association. They are then free to concentrate on competing with each 
other by other means. Nor need such collusion be to the detriment of the consumer. By reinforcing 
training and other institutions at the industrial level, it can uphold quality standards for goods and 
services. It is likely to prevent a degrading ‘race to the bottom’ in employment conditions. 
 
In Europe and some other countries, the result in due course was a remarkably stable organisational 
arrangement: the industrial agreement. Sometimes called a ‘multi-employer’ or ‘sectoral’ agreement, 
this became the foundation of collective bargaining in European industrialised countries for much of 
the 20th century.  Such arrangements often started on a local basis. Clegg notes that in Britain ‘until the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century, most employers’ associations were limited to a single town or 
region’ (Clegg, 1970: 121). But they generally developed, in response to wider industrial conflict, and 
depending on the ease of transport of the product, to regional or national level. In his study of the 
cotton industry, Turner notes that such development tended to be more unstable when the employers 
had a strong cartel or monopoly element, ‘but once it is clear that the unions are established, the 
employing body may move to a quite opposite attitude, of accommodation to collective organisation 
among its workers’ (Turner, 1962: 378). And once such bargaining structures were established as the 
main means of fixing pay rates, working hours, holiday entitlements, and so on, they would typically 
become powerfully reinforced with their own distinct apprenticeship arrangements, dispute procedures 
and, in most European countries, legal support.  
 
Despite the fact that these industrial agreements were technically in constraint of trade, they 
commanded considerable governmental support. In effect, government tolerated the restraint they 
placed on competition because of the benefits they offered in terms of industrial peace and good 
employment standards. From the late 19th century onwards, industry-based collective bargaining was 
officially encouraged by British governments, typically as arrangements that were generally called 
National Joint Industrial Councils. In industries where unions were too weak for these, then the Wages 
Boards (later Wages Councils) were established, on the bases of the distinct product markets where 
labour exploitation was seen to be a problem – Coffin Furniture; Cotton Waste Reclamation; Keg and 
Drum manufacture; Lace Finishing, or whatever. As recently as 1961, the Ministry of Labour’s official 
Industrial Relations Handbook could say:  
‘When the agreement is made by a number of different employers or, as is often the 
case, by an employers’ association acting on behalf of the whole or the greater part of 
the firms in a given industry within a wide area, all the workers employed by the 
employers concerned are secured equality of treatment, while each employer is 
protected against unfair competition by reason of lower wages costs in so far as his 
competitors are parties to the agreement. For many years collective agreements have 
played a most important part in the regulation of working conditions in this country’ 
(Ministry of Labour, 1961: 18). 
 
In effect, European governments accepted the implied inefficiencies arising from this 
officially blessed, industry-wide collusion against the consumer, in return for the 
public benefits in terms of industrial peace, effective training management, and a raft 
of individual employment rights. In Britain there were adverse inflationary 
implications that first emerged in the late 1950s, exacerbated by declining 
productivity growth, but it was not until the late 1980s that government ministers 
were publicly to criticize industrial agreements as a source of inefficiency and 
uncompetitiveness. As a senior government minister, Kenneth Clarke, put it, in urging 
the abandonment of pay rises linked to industrial agreements:  ‘If we move to a 
system where pay increases are based primarily on performance, merit, company 
profitability, and demand and supply in the local labour market, we will dethrone 
once and for all the annual pay round and the belief that pay increases do not have to 
be earned’ (Financial Times, 12th February 1987). 
 
The benefits of collusion in the product market as a basis for managing labour relations were 
substantial. Trade unions whose organisational logic was tied to a particular skill or occupation, rather 
than product market, (such as those based on craft) would accommodate to industrial collective 
bargaining by becoming, for these purposes alone, members of union federations, such as the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions. In industries characterised by considerable 
heterogeneity of product market – such as engineering – employers would exercise substantial 
discretion at workplace level but, on the key issues of basic wage rates and hours of work, they would 
follow the industrial agreement (Marsh, 1965: 176).  
 
The grip of the industry agreement was usually tighter in industries characterised by homogeneity of 
production technique and product, such as the manufacture of hosiery, or ceramics, or carpets, or 
newspapers. Some employers’ associations imposed considerable discipline, including the enforcement 
of lock-outs.  In cotton, for instance, they fined mill owners who continued to run their mills when their 
association was in dispute with unions; they refused help to member firms who paid above or below 
agreed wage-rates; and as late as 1950, they expelled firms which paid unauthorised bonuses on wages 
(Turner, 1962: 377). Even today some continue to exercise discipline over their members, such as the 
association that organises electrical contractors for the construction industry, where licensing and 
safety issues are dominant.  
 
Because labour can itself be so contentious and troublesome to manage, competing employers have a 
strong incentive to take it out of contention as an issue between themselves. Despite this, there have 
always been some employers who have pursued their own independent, enlightened employment 
practices as a distinctive means of product market competition. A number of Quaker-owned British 
firms come to mind that invested heavily in long-term relationships with employees and in their 
broader social welfare. Thereby they undoubtedly gained competitive advantage. But for most of the 
19th and 20th centuries this sort of benign, employee-oriented independence remained very much more 
the exception than the rule (Donkin, 2001). 
 
The break up of product market based bargaining structure 
The starting point of this account of the underlying market dynamics of industrial relations was the 
predisposition of firms to concentrate, whether in competition or collusion, on the market in which 
their goods and services are traded. Wages are secondary to prices. If employees organise themselves 
into trade unions, sooner or later they have to come to terms with the employers’ primary concern with 
the product market, and organise accordingly. As a consequence, firms’ normal response, for most of 
the 20th century, and for most developed economies (with the notable exception of the United States), 
was to confront the unions with employers’ associations and to negotiate product market based, and 
hence industry based, collective agreements. 
 
This was a satisfactory compromise so long as two conditions prevailed. The first was that the rival 
firms were sufficiently evenly matched within their product market, and gaining sufficiently from their 
collusion, for there to be inadequate net benefit to induce one or more larger firms to break away and 
deal with trade unions on their own (Ulman, 1974). The second condition was that trade unions were 
able to organise all relevant workers across the whole of the appropriate product market, in order to 
ensure that the firms they dealt with would not be undercut by competitors, able to gain advantage from 
employing cheaper labour. 
 
The first condition prevailed in Europe, but it was not sustainable in Japan and the United States. 
European governments of the first part of the 20th century generally provided substantial legislative 
support for industry-based collective bargaining and also often for the associated training 
arrangements, welfare and employment rights. In large part this was because these countries had 
political parties backed by trade unions, whose periods in government sustained this legal support. 
Thus both trade union security and employer solidarity received statutory support, and strong industrial 
agreements were a consequence. Japan and the United States, by contrast, not only lacked union-
backed political parties with a commitment to collective bargaining, but had major industries that were, 
from early on, characterised by a relatively small number of dominant firms for which there were no 
net benefits from industry-based collective bargaining (Sisson, 1987).  
 
In Europe, it was in Britain that industry-based bargaining first started to crumble. Initially this was 
because Britain’s very laissez-faire legal structure provided little reinforcement to industrial bargaining 
and training institutions. These came under particular pressure when labour markets were tight in the 
1950s and 1960s, creating exceptional strains between employers seeking to attract and retain scarce 
labour. One after another, industrial agreements began to break up, usually when a dominant employer 
felt that they would gain more by controlling their own industrial relations strategy, most commonly by 
improving the motivational power of their internal pay structure and by paying higher rates. Early 
examples were Cadbury leaving the confectionary makers, Dunlop leaving the rubber manufacturers, 
and Esso leaving the petroleum refiners (Brown and Terry, 1978: 130). Here we have cases of mainly 
labour market pressures causing the break-up of employer solidarity and hence of industrially based 
bargaining units. But this was happening firmly within the bounds of a secure national product market. 
By contrast, the second precondition is challenged by threats to the integrity of national product 
markets themselves. 
 
The second precondition for industry-based collective bargaining is a trade union organisation that is 
sufficiently comprehensive to encompass the whole product market. As has been noted, the early 
expansion of product markets as transport improved within countries brought no insurmountable 
problems. Unions and employer associations connived to out-flank and match each other in expanding 
the geographic scope of collective agreements. But once agreements reached national frontiers this 
process of joint regulation stopped. Extending further was no problem for what Commons described as 
the ‘merchant retailers’. They simply bought wherever abroad price and transport costs provided the 
cheapest package. Nor did expanding overseas necessarily impede the established national producers 
who, as the 20th century drew to a close, increasingly outsourced abroad or became multi-national and 
established their own production facilities in cheap labour countries. 
 
For trade unions, however, the challenge of incoming, cheaper product substitutes from beyond 
national frontiers has been severe and often insuperable. There is over a hundred years of history of 
attempts at international trade union co-operation. Ten industry-specific ‘global union federations’ are 
currently associated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. They cover broad 
separate industrial areas such as transport, journalism, metalworking, and chemicals, energy and 
mining (Levinson, 1972). But whatever they contribute in terms of communication, lobbying, and the 
spread of good practice, there is no evidence that they have made a major contribution to the exercise 
of power in collective bargaining (Borgers, 2000; Cooke, 2005). Of the many obstacles that confront 
attempts to build international trade union solidarity, the greatest challenge is probably simply that of 
getting workers in one country to make sacrifices and worsen their own job prospects in defence of 
workers in another country whose jobs are under threat. Even in domestic disputes, collective action 
makes tough demands on worker altruism; the evidence is that such demands become unsustainable 
when extended across frontiers. International trade union co-operation can, through political action and 
consumer bans, play a part in inhibiting the irresponsible use of exploited labour in other countries. 
There has recently been some development of cross-frontier union co-operation within the European 
Union (Marginson and Sisson, 2004). But experience suggests that the international use of direct 
coercion by collective sanctions is not an available option. 
 
The challenge facing trade unions is growing massively. Product markets have, in recent decades, 
become substantially more exposed to international competitive pressures. This is because the world 
economy has become steadily more open to trade. The annual growth of international trade since the 
last World War has been consistently higher than the annual growth in world output, and over the past 
20 or so years has been twice as great. Quite apart from this relative growth of trade between nations, 
the number of major trading nations and the size of the world’s competitive base have increased. The 
emergence of China, India, and the old Soviet nations as serious competitors since about 1990 has 
roughly doubled the worldwide reservoir of employees competing for jobs. These ‘new’ trading 
countries threaten exceptionally tough competition not only in terms of low wage rates but also, and of 
greater long-term significance, in terms of relatively high standards of education.  
 
The internationalisation of product markets has also been increased by the internationalisation of 
company ownership. Foreign direct investment has over the past 20 years increased at twice the annual 
rate of world trade, facilitated by technological developments that have improved long-distance 
transport, communication, and control systems (Singh and Zammit, 2004; Acocella, 2005). The 
movement of jobs between countries, even while still within individual enterprises, becomes ever 
easier. Companies can easily move to sources of labour beyond the reach of both trade unions and legal 
employment protections. 
 
From the trade union point of view, the prospects of gaining any effective bargaining leverage on ever 
more sprawling product markets are bleak. There have, of course, always been some unionised 
industrial sectors that have been exposed to foreign competition. A feature of the trade unions most 
affected is that they have often shown considerable sensitivity to this source of vulnerability. Thus, for 
example, in the 1960s and 1970s, the export-oriented metal-working unions took the lead in promoting 
counter-inflationary domestic economic policies in Germany, Switzerland and Australia (Crouch, 
1993: 268; Kitaj and Lansbury, 1997: 225). But in the 20th century the challenge was often from 
unionised labour elsewhere, and in a relatively limited number of sectors of manufactures. More 
recently, international competition has intruded into an increasing range of both manufactures and 
services, and it has been much less constrained by trade unions, not least because their coverage has 
been diminishing in most countries. There are still some sheltered sectors. Unions are responding to the 
fact that many personal services are, by their nature, not amenable to overseas substitution, and thus 
offer substantial organisational potential (Milkman, 2004). But elsewhere they are finding ever fewer 
sectors tenable for effective industrial collective agreements.  
 
In Britain this has been partly reflected in the steady contraction in the coverage of industrial (multi-
employer) collective agreements as the main basis of pay fixing in the private sector. They had covered 
the majority of the private sector workforce in 1960. By 2004, however, industrial agreements covered 
only 4 per cent of private sector workers (in workplaces with 10 or more employees). Another 17 per 
cent of the workers in such workplaces were covered by enterprise-based (single-employer) 
agreements. But the remaining four fifths of the private sector workforce had lost the support of any 
collective bargaining whatsoever (Kersley et al, 2006: 186).  
 
Product market circumstances have also influenced the manner of this radical restructuring of 
collective bargaining. A survey of UK multi-plant enterprises was conducted in 1985, at a time when 
industrial agreements were already in retreat, and when the single-employer bargaining, at that time to 
some extent replacing them, was close to its peak (Marginson et al., 1988). This confirmed that their 
adjustment was influenced by their exposure to international competition: ‘…it is employers whose 
companies compete primarily within the UK who appear to be most interested in taking wages ‘out of 
competition’ either on an intra-enterprise or an intra-industry basis.’ (Marginson et al., 1988: 150).  
 
Firms’ internal arrangements are strongly influenced by their product markets. The survey by 
Marginson and his colleagues showed that, as employers withdrew from industrial agreements 
(whether or not they continued to recognise trade unions), they tended to restructure their internal pay-
fixing arrangements along product market lines so that pay could be linked more directly to the 
performance of specific business units, whether profit centres, divisions, or individual establishments. 
As a result, for any particular establishment in one of these multi-plant companies, what tended to 
matter in terms of pay levels depended not on where the establishment was in the country 
geographically – that is, on its local labour market – but where it was situated in the business – that is, 
on its product market. Thus, even when divorced from collusion with their competitors, and when free 
to manage their own employment policies, employers remain focused primarily upon the demands of 
the market for their product, rather than the demands of the market for their labour. 
 
The use of proxy product markets in the public sector 
When we turn to the public sector, the influence of product markets on industrial relations was 
traditionally notable for its absence. This was simply because, operating in non-traded goods and 
services, these large and, in most countries, highly unionised industries were unconstrained by normal 
market forces. Their labour markets are distinctive because the employer is usually the dominant 
provider and purchaser of specialist skills – whether soldiering, teaching, nursing, fire-fighting, or 
whatever. Their product markets are even more aberrant because, quite apart from the absence of any 
price-fixing mechanism, questions of quality and distribution are by their nature politically determined. 
This tends to place trade unions in a strong bargaining position, although they have traditionally been 
reluctant (and in some countries legally unable) to use it. Pay is usually fixed by reference to external 
comparison with the private sector.  ‘Rent’ is reflected in levels of job security, manning levels, and job 
control. If public sector employment were preserved in this isolation from the traded sector, its 
industrial relations would remain a very large ‘special case’ on the margins of the present discussion. 
 
Product market change has, however, become a crucial issue for the public sectors of most western 
industrialised countries in recent years. In large part this has been because there has been widespread 
privatisation. For political, fiscal, strategic and economic reasons, a variety of usually highly unionised 
industries have been sold to the private sector. In Britain, this has included railways, bus transport, road 
haulage, telecommunications, docks, vehicle, aircraft and ship manufacture, steel, gas, water, 
electricity, coal, munitions, airlines, research laboratories, recruitment services, waste disposal, 
airports, publishing, and much else. For most of these, the transition, since the 1980s, to the demands of 
a more-or-less competitive product market was traumatic and often strike-ridden. In Australia, as in 
Britain, trade union membership has usually fallen substantially, and established patterns of job control 
and work organisation have been changed beyond recognition (Kitaj and Lansbury, 1997; Brown et al., 
1998). 
 
The chastening effect of the introduction of product market pressures on both trade union and 
managerial behaviour has had a substantial influence over British government policy towards those 
public services that have remained in state ownership. Since the 1980s, governments have introduced a 
number of devices to mimic or partially create similar stimuli. Those that introduced direct competition 
include: compulsory outsourcing of, and compulsory tendering for, non-core activities, such as catering 
and cleaning in hospitals and schools; building and highways maintenance for local government; pilot 
training for the armed forces; and prisoner transport for goals. One of the clearest examples where 
partial exposure to markets has had a fundamental impact on industrial relations was the creation, since 
the 1990s, of some privately owned and managed prisons. Covering about ten per cent of the British 
prison population at time of writing, the existence of these, and the threat of more, has permitted the 
relatively peaceful introduction of a number of procedural constraints on the use of collective action by 
previously often militant prison officers.  
 
Much quasi-market intervention in Britain has been less direct. Throughout the health and education 
sectors, a proliferation of league tables and associated performance measures has been used to try to 
channel funds and users in ways that might stimulate efficient labour management. The civil service 
has seen its once monolithic pay structure broken up – mimicking private sector multi-divisional 
enterprises - into mock product market fragments reflecting the domains of different departments and 
agencies. The net effects of these changes across public services, in terms of efficiency and service 
delivery, remain highly controversial. Industrial relations have certainly become more overtly 
conflictual by comparison with the private sector. While public services accounted for a small minority 
of strike action until the 1990s, during the years 2000-05 they consistently accounted for at least a half 
of all strikes and three-quarters of all working days lost through strikes in the UK (ONS, 2006: 186). 
Some trade union opposition to quasi-market innovations has been successful. An example was the 
teachers’ success in blunting the impact of performance-related pay in 1999. But generally the 
introduction of proxies for product markets has had the government’s desired effect of diminishing the 
influence of public sector trade unions. 
 
It was noted earlier that the condition of the labour market is of great importance to the relative power 
of employers and unions, but that they do battle on a field delineated by the employers’ product market. 
It was also noted that the labour market for the public sector, which in Britain now largely means the 
public services, was highly constrained, with the state being the main provider and the main purchaser 
of the specialist skills required. This places the state, as employer, in a relatively weak position with 
regard to its employees, not least because of the political costs arising from the disruption of public 
services. The radical changes in public sector industrial relations of the past twenty or so years can be 
seen as a response to this. There has been a restructuring of incentives by the state in an effort to 
ensure, to use the previous metaphor, that power follows the contours of the market for the services 
delivered, not those of the market for labour delivering them, and thereby to rebuild the authority of the 
state as an employer.  
 
The economic evidence of product market effects 
In a perfectly competitive product market, the role of trade unions is highly constrained. They may 
engage in co-operative behaviour aimed at improving a firm’s productivity. Sometimes called 
‘partnership’ in Britain and ‘mutual gains’ in the United States, this has become more evident in the 
past decade in response to tighter competition. But any more confrontational action that succeeded in 
raising wages or improving work conditions without compensating productivity improvements may 
threaten the survival of the firm and its jobs by rendering it uncompetitive. Most product markets are, 
however, to varying extents, imperfectly competitive. The firms that operate successfully within them 
receive the resulting rents as monopoly profits. Whether trade unions are able to obtain a share of those 
rents, and thereby benefit their members, depends upon the organisational issues discussed earlier.  
 
Even if unions cannot organise the whole product market, the degree of its imperfection has 
considerable bearing on their strategy. An imperfect product market implies that the individual firms 
operating in it have some monopoly power. This may arise, among other things, from a distinctive 
product, a good reputation for service, or a familiar brand-name. If unions can organise firms that have 
monopoly power, they should be able extract some of the rent as benefits for their members. Even if 
the firm is in such a competitive situation that there is no rent, or if there is rent but the union cannot 
mobilise the strength to bargain a share of it, the union may still maintain employer recognition and 
employee members through co-operative strategies that, for example, facilitate superior quality of 
service. 
 
Similarly, in a perfect labour market, employees of like skills and other attributes would be paid the 
same, irrespective of the profitability of their employers. But in practice, labour markets are also 
imperfect. As we have seen, one reason for this is the active role that employers play in ‘taking wages 
out of competition’ in order to bring stability to labour management. But the ending of the collusive 
fixing of wages with industrial collective agreements does not end the manipulation of wages by 
employers. Employers when bereft of employers’ associations do not necessarily become passive ‘price 
takers’. For all but the smallest firms, or those dealing in transitory and relatively unskilled labour, 
employers remain, within fairly broad labour market constraints, active ‘price makers’. But they do so 
with the objective of maximising the productivity of their labour. Internal pay structures are delicate 
motivational devices, whether or not they include performance-related pay and other explicit 
incentives. Notions of ‘fair pay’ are essentially concerned with relative pay, and the pay comparisons 
most intensely felt by workers arise within the enterprise. The demotivating consequences of internal 
pay mis-management can rapidly corrode labour productivity. Internal pay structures require constant 
management attention. 
 
Once away from an industrial agreement, employers thus place great emphasis on the integrity of their 
firms’ internal pay structures, adapting them to the particular needs of their businesses, while keeping a 
weather-eye on their local labour market pay levels in order to keep broadly in line with other 
employers. The effects of this were clearly demonstrated by a study of employees in seven occupations 
in 25 firms in the Coventry engineering industry over the decade of the 1970s, a watershed period in 
which these firms were breaking away from industrial collective bargaining into managing their own 
pay (Nolan and Brown, 1983). The study showed clearly how, as the decade progressed, the size of the 
annual pay rise an individual received owed less and less to their occupation, and more and more to the 
firm they were in. For the increasingly independent employers, in toughly competitive product markets, 
the labour market was a loose constraint. The important determinant of pay was ‘…the way in which 
employers manage work and pay so as to maximise their control over unit costs and output’ (op. cit.: 
284). 
 
In Britain’s private sector during the post-War years of relatively high trade union strength, employees’ 
pay did generally reflect their firm’s profitability (Carruth and Oswald, 1989: 166). But while this is 
consistent with a link between product market circumstances and industrial relations outcomes, it is far 
from sufficient evidence, because firms have many reasons for success other than the product market in 
which they are placed. One study that explored this further exploited the peculiar characteristics of 
Australia’s wage-fixing system that made it possible to identify, by occupation and establishment, 
informal establishment-negotiated pay increases over and above the quasi-judicially established 
industrial rates (Brown, Hayles, Hughes and Rowe, 1984). The survey was conducted in 1974 of nearly 
20,000 employees in 44 occupations in 198 establishments across nine industries in the urban labour 
market of Adelaide. The analysis suggested, as had the Coventry time-series study cited above, that pay 
settlements at establishment level owed more to the circumstances of the employer than to the 
occupation of the employee. More important, the analysis also suggested that the variance in the size of 
these establishment settlements correlated with the concentration ratio of the industry they were in. The 
less competitive was the industry, the less were the establishment-specific determinants of pay. It was 
concluded that wages paid by individual employers in excess of the industrial rates could only partly be 
explained in terms of meeting the needs of the local labour market. They also appeared to reflect  
‘…employers’ efforts, within the bounds of their product market power, to construct internal pay 
structures that will placate their employees, and motivate them to work productively’ (op. cit.: 175). 
 
The influence of product markets is also reflected in the changing impact of collective bargaining.  In a 
review of the micro-economic effects of trade unions, Metcalf notes that several studies in the 1980s 
had reported a negative association between union presence and financial performance. But by 1990 
there were distinctive product market effects. Research suggested that  ‘over the course of the 1980s 
this negative impact weakened such that by 1990 the overall union effect was halved as compared to 
1984 and unionised establishments had lower financial performance only where the union was strong 
and the establishment had some market power’ (Wilkinson, 2000: 3). ‘This tempering of the impact of 
unions was confirmed by Machin and Stewart (1996) who concluded that by 1990 unions only 
impacted adversely on profitability where there was a closed shop and/or weak competition in the 
product market’ (Metcalf, 2003: 146).  
 
‘The intensity of competition has a profound effect on what unions can do…It is well known that non-
competitive product markets permit unions to raise wages. But unions can capture product market rents 
in forms other than wages’, observes Metcalf, citing their propensity to protect members by introducing 
rigidities in work organisation, rigidities which may incidently discourage innovation and thus 
productivity growth (op. cit.: 155). His own analysis of the 1998 British WERS (using over 1100 
workplaces in the trading sector) permitted him to investigate this in unusual detail (controlling for a 
substantial number of workplace and workforce variables) because the survey contained comparative 
measures of labour productivity and of financial performance. When there is relatively low 
competition, with the firm reporting five or fewer competitors, ‘the probability of above average labour 
productivity is 14 per cent lower for a unionised workplace than its non-union counterpart. But when 
there are six or more competitors the corresponding figure is 0.6 per cent (not statistically significant). 
And when there is little product market competition the likelihood of above average financial 
performance is 12.4 per cent lower for a union than non-union workplace, yet the corresponding figure 
is 7.4 per cent higher with a more competitive product market’ (op. cit.: 157). This is powerful 
evidence that product market competition plays a crucial role in determining union influence over both 
working practices and pay levels: the tighter the competition, the less the union influence. 
 
The longer-term implications for trade unions are serious. Noting Blanchard’s observation that across 
OECD countries ‘rents are getting smaller, leading to less room for rent extraction … this decrease in 
attractiveness [of unions to members] is reflected, in nearly all countries, by decreased membership and 
support’ (Boeri et al., 2001: 295), Metcalf concludes that ‘more intense product market competition 
implies a corrosion of the impact of union recognition in the workplace which suggests that in the 
longer term unions may need to find a different role if they are to prosper’ (op. cit.: 157). It is a 
conclusion arrived at by the very different route of economic modelling of recent labour market 
performance in the United States and Europe by Ebell, Doppelhofer and Haefke (2004: 11) which 
concludes that the decline in unionisation in the US and UK might have been a direct consequence of 
product market reforms of the 1980s. 
 
The picture that emerges from these quantitative studies is consistent with the earlier more descriptive 
account.  As product markets become more internationally exposed, employers find it increasingly 
difficult to manage labour through employers’ associations. If they cannot exercise control over wages 
by collusion with each other, they have the option of going alone, and making more active use of their 
payment systems as motivational devices. If employers’ associations do break up, the ending of the 
industrial collective agreements associated with them has severe implications for trade union 
recognition. Bargaining may continue with employers on an individual basis, but its success is 
dependent upon the extent of those employers’ monopoly power, as well as the union’s organisational 
strength. Recent years have seen a reduction in trade unions’ capacity to bargain a share of rents, both 
because those rents may have diminished and because unions are less able to mobilise effective 
bargaining power over geographically extended product markets. In the public services, the largely 
monopolistic and exclusively national nature of the product market ensures that the role of public 
employees’ unions is relatively secure. But the scope for private sector trade unions in sectors exposed 
to foreign competition is becoming increasingly curtailed. 
 
The transmission of product market circumstances into workplace relations 
Thus far this discussion has been concerned with the broad structures of industrial relations and how 
they are shaped by product market circumstances. But product markets also impact upon day-to-day 
industrial relations in a much more immediate way. By what means do product markets actually change 
behaviour and thereby shape the ways employers treat workers? 
 
A study conducted in the heavy bargaining environment of the British engineering industry of the 
1960s permitted a close examination of this question (Brown, 1973). The subject of enquiry was the 
individual piecework payment systems that were then prevalent in the industry. They were widely 
perceived to be a major cause of wage inflation through ‘wage drift’ processes that involved no formal 
negotiation. What were the origins of piecework pay rises, and why did their pace differ substantially 
between factories? Case studies of ten factories provided detailed individual wage data over several 
years, as well as opportunities for extensive interviews and observation. A close relationship was 
identified between the pace of informally derived piecework pay rises, on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the widely understood but unwritten, local workshop ‘rules’ that in effect regulated the informal 
bargaining over piecework ‘prices’. These rules were not formally negotiated but developed as ‘custom 
and practice’. This was primarily as a result of low-level managerial errors that, once accepted as 
desirable by workers, tended to become taken as binding precedents by their shop stewards and 
defended by threats of strike action. The relevant rules concerned questions such as the criteria for re-
evaluating piecework prices, the appropriate level of compensation payment when machines broke 
down, and the restrictions placed on the managerial staff who set the prices.  
 
What determined the leniency, from the pieceworker’s point of view, of these ‘custom and practice’ 
rules? Two influences were identified. One was the slackness of management controls over work: over 
such matters as the recording of working time, the foreman’s freedom to compensate for lost 
pieceworking time, and departmental cost controls. The other was the authority and coherence of the 
factories’ shop stewards’ committees, which had a potential role in controlling unruly bargaining that 
might jeopardise union solidarity. Both influences, the slackness of controls and the lack of authority of 
the shop steward organisation, were then shown to correlate with a composite measure of the 
constraints exercised by product market and technological factors.  
 
The relevant conclusions drawn were, first, that the rules governing the bargaining process are 
‘…heavily influenced by the control systems that managements see fit to install in their factories’. 
Second, that ‘the principal pressures influencing management control systems are those of the product 
market, and different product markets can vary considerably in both the degree and the character of 
their competitiveness’ (op. cit.:175). Third, that ‘…the organisational and bargaining characteristics of 
the workforce are not the root causes of poor management controls; a weakly integrated workforce may 
exacerbate the weaknesses of a control system further but it will have been the initial inadequacy of the 
controls which made the integration of the shop steward body difficult in the first place’ (op. cit.: 171). 
And, finally, that ‘…under relatively full employment and trade union organisation, it is the product 
market rather than the labour market which has the major economic impact upon piecework wage 
determination’ (op. cit.: 175). 
 
The chain of influence described here is fairly straight-forward. An uncompetitive product market does 
not directly cause poor management, but it does increase the probability of it because it provides an 
environment in which management has little incentive to devote resources to building and maintaining 
effective controls over labour and production. Sloppy controls give rise to inconsistency of payment 
and treatment of workers that generates discontents and encourages worker constraints on the 
organisation of work. Loss of control is manifest in many ways, and the firm unwittingly concedes to 
its workers much of the rent accruing from its partial monopoly position. For the workers, the rent they 
thereby gain takes various largely haphazard forms: inequitably distributed ‘windfall’ pay rises, 
substantial control over the pace and conduct of work, discretion over job mobility, control over 
overtime, and so on. A loss of focus on competition in the product market leads to a loss of control 
over the management of the labour market. 
 
The post-War British engineering industry was far from unique in this response to weak product market 
competition. Other major industries have seen similar development of haphazard workplace rent 
sharing arising from weak managerial controls. This was perhaps most notable in the decade or so of 
slack competition that followed the devastation of potential overseas competitors during the Second 
World War. Thus the docks industry saw its workforce develop diverse localised controls over 
manning, piecework, and work allocation (Mellish, 1972). National newspapers allowed their union 
chapels to exercise almost complete control over work patterns, overtime and manning levels, a level of 
restriction that must have provided a barrier to new entrants from which the owners probably benefited 
(Sisson, 1975). The petroleum refining and distribution industry allowed middle managers repeatedly 
to concede aspects of the management of overtime to local union branches (Flanders, 1964; Ahlstrand, 
1990). One could go on. A lack of financial restraint on employers is often associated with poor labour 
management – the stable lads employed by race-horse trainers and the household staff of British 
royalty provide well-documented examples - because the employer has little financial incentive to 
respond positively to the needs and capabilities of employees. 
 
The more recent history of British industrial relations has been dominated by varied responses to 
tightening product markets. For some whole industries the shock has been so great, and the response so 
inadequate, that they have contracted almost to the point of vanishing in the face of overseas 
competition – coal-mining, ceramics, ship-building, footwear, textiles and clothing are examples. Some 
companies have responded by derecognising unions, sometimes also out-sourcing work to non-union 
organisations – television, facilities management, newspapers, and banking provide examples. A 
common response has been to maintain formal union recognition but implicitly to reduce it 
substantially by reducing both the range of issues subject to negotiation and the influence that unions 
can have over them (Brown et al., 1998; Brown et al., 2000). Increasingly this has been combined with 
explicit co-operative bargaining arrangements (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002). In all cases the primary 
driver for change has been heightened product market competition, and an accompanying feature has 
been a much-weakened trade union, less capable of accessing rents for its members other than through 
co-operative strategies. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that product markets form the foundation upon which industrial relations 
institutions are built. Trade union strength with respect to employers is, of course, much affected by the 
tightness of the labour market, whether that arises from an economic boom, or from effective union 
controls over labour supply, or whatever else. But it is pre-existing imperfections in the product market 
that permit collective bargaining to deliver benefits to workers. The greater the imperfections, the 
greater the scope for union members to benefit, provided their union can exercise effective leverage 
over all suppliers to the product market, or over individual employers who occupy a sufficiently 
monopolistic position within it. 
 
It has been argued here that the configuration of product markets has been moving in ways that are 
increasingly adverse for collective bargaining. This is of less significance in the public sector. 
Although even there the state has been eroding the bargaining position of public sector trade unions by 
mimicking product market incentives in order to weaken the employers’ focus on labour. But the 
changing nature of product markets is of deep significance for the private sector, where so much 
employment is now exposed to competition from parts of the world where neither trade unions nor 
statutory minimum labour standards offer significant constraints.  
 
Denied effective coercive bargaining power because of tighter product market competition, trade 
unions in many sectors are obliged to focus increasingly on strategies which in the past have tended to 
augment, rather than replace, confrontational bargaining. One of these is co-operative working with 
employers through the arrangements sometimes referred to as ‘partnership’ and ‘mutual gains’. The 
success of this depends very much upon the willingness of the employer to make it effective and to 
encourage trade union membership as a means of upholding good employment practice.  
 
Another strategy that is well-established in Europe is that of lobbying the government to improve 
statutory support for employment standards. Legal enforcement of improved terms and conditions is 
directly important to union members as to any other employees. It is also establishes a floor on which 
collective bargaining can build without fear of being seriously under-cut. The improvement of statutory 
rights such as minimum wages and maximum working hours is of particular importance to unions 
seeking to organise those large numbers of workers in the private services where international 
competition does not pose a threat. A major stimulus since the 1970s has come from the European 
Union, but the addition of poorer new member states of Eastern Europe will slow this down.  
 
A third strategy, aimed at tackling the huge difficulties raised by the globalisation of product markets, 
is that of consumer campaigns, whereby adverse publicity is given to those brand names which use 
suppliers with poor labour standards. During the past decade such campaigns have prompted a 
substantial increase in the use of publicly reported ‘ethical trading audits’ by both major consumer 
good brand names and major supermarket chains. The challenge such campaigns face is formidable. 
Because trading enterprises steer by the commercial imperatives of their product markets then, to the 
extent that their markets are global, the standards of employment for increasing numbers of workers 
will tend to be dragged down by the depth of inequality of labour across the world economy. The 
campaigners have to counter this by appealing to the consciences of consumers, and thereby 
threatening the reputation of the brand names and supermarkets. It is a vivid vindication of John 
Commons’ emphasis, a hundred years ago, on the pivotal role of the ‘merchant retailer’. 
 
This chapter has been concerned with the interaction of markets and institutions. A major role of trade 
unions has always been to build institutions to provide the agreements and other protections that might 
insulate their members from the harsh vagaries of the market for their labour. Such vagaries have, in 
turn, depended heavily upon the markets for the goods and services that their labour produced. 
Ensuring that the geographic reach of union organisation equalled that of their members’ labour 
markets was relatively straight-forward. Doing the same for their employers’ product markets was 
more difficult. But it suited the employers’ own desire to remove employment as an issue of 
competitive contention and, with state support, provided the basis for nationally based employment 
regulation for many countries for most of the 20th century.  
 
Collective bargaining, and national statutory labour standards, tamed labour markets so long as product 
markets were predominantly nation-based. It has been the increasingly international nature of the world 
economy that has thrown these systems into disarray. Product markets that extend beyond the reach of 
either union movements or national governments now threaten the security and well-being of workers 
world-wide. The challenge for the 21st century is to develop new international institutions, capable of 
protecting decent labour standards and of diminishing the inequalities that will otherwise destroy them. 
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